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ABSTRACT
Traditionally, the primary focus of the chemical industry has 
been safety and productivity.  However, recent threats to our 
nation’s critical infrastructure have prompted a tightening of 
security measures across many different industry sectors.  
Reducing control system vulnerabilities against physical and cyber 
attack is necessary to ensure the safety, reliability, integrity and 
availability of these systems.  The U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security has developed a strategy to secure these vulnerabilities.  
Crucial to this strategy is the Control Systems Security and Test 
Center (CSSTC) established to test and analyze control systems 
and their components.  In addition, the CSSTC promotes a 
proactive, collaborative approach to increase industry’s 
awareness of standards, products and processes that can enhance 
the security of control systems.  This paper outlines measures that 
can be taken to enhance the cybersecurity of process control 
systems in the chemical sector.   
1. INTRODUCTION
Evidences of safe working environments and practices and secure working places are 
found in almost every chemical plant.  The evidence for cybersecurity is not as readily 
apparent.  However, keeping computers and networks free from viruses and hackers (and 
available for productive use) is just as important as keeping thieves and terrorists out of 
the plant.  The purpose of this paper is to establish the need for cybersecurity for the 
chemical industry and to identify the common vulnerabilities of control systems. 
2. DISCUSSION
The Safety Mind-Frame
Security, like safety, must be an integral part of any chemical process.  Operating 
procedures are developed with the safety of workers, the public, and our environment in 
mind.  Equipment is designed with safety in mind.  The proper protective equipment is 
worn with safety in mind.  Physical security surrounds the chemical plant.  “Guards, 
gates and guns” are used to ensure the environment is safe for the workers.  It protects the 
documents and processes that are business sensitive and classified.  The right people are 
let through the guard gate and the wrong people are kept out.   
Both physical security and cybersecurity are put in place with safety in mind.  
cybersecurity protects control systems to keep the chemical processes working safely and 
efficiently.  It ensures the data are not compromised.  It keeps the computer viruses, 
worms, Trojans, etc. from infecting the computers on the network and from affecting the 
control systems.  It lets the right people access the controls and information, and keeps 
the wrong people off the controls denying them access to sensitive and proprietary 
information and out of the network. 
Cybersecurity – Is the Threat Real?
Cybersecurity threats are real and they happen every day to people in all walks of life.  
With the modernization of control system equipment more systems are interconnected 
and more importantly, more systems are linked at some level to the internet.  With each 
additional connection comes one more doorway by which a hacker, curious or malicious, 
can enter.  Additionally the control system networks are becoming more public.  
Operations within a chemical or electrical have traditionally been closed and little was 
known about them to the outsider.   Last year at one of the principle cyber forums in this 
country, a hacker gave a presentation on control systems.  Interest and curiosity is rising 
along with the visibility.   
Cyber attacks can slow the computer’s response and the networks speed or bring 
everything to a complete halt, causing a denial of service.  Cyber attacks can also cause 
unwanted and unexpected results.  In the world of chemical processing where efficiency 
is critical to making a profit, an undetected cyber attack can slow the process and reduce 
the efficiency of the plant.  An article from the Rand Corporation stated, “Attacks in 
cyberspace blur traditional boundaries between nations and private interests, cannot be 
foreseen or tracked via classical intelligence methods, and are all but indistinguishable 
from accidents, system failures or even hacker pranks.”1  The critical infrastructure of the 
United States provides many lucrative targets. 
A well known example of a cyber attack that had disastrous results occurred in 
Australia.  A contractor who had been instrumental in installing the network for a waste 
management company “caused millions of litres of raw sewage to spill out into local 
parks, rivers and even the grounds of a Hyatt Regency hotel. . . Marine life died, the 
creek water turned black and the stench was unbearable for residents.”2  A series of cyber 
attacks had been occurring for at least 2 months before the waste management company 
learned what was happening and identified the source of the trouble. 
In January 2003, the slammer worm caused the Internet to slow down to a crawl.  The 
Bank of America reported “that customers at a majority of its 13,000 automatic teller 
machines were unable to process customer transactions.”3  It is not hard to imagine how a 
Chemical process could become paralyzed if a similar worm were to infect their network 
system. 
The CERT Coordination Center has kept statistics on the number of incidents that 
have been reported to them between 1988 and 2003.  The number of cybersecurity 
incidents reported each year has been rising rapidly.  In 1999, there were about 10,000 
incidents reported.  In 2003, there were almost 140,000 incidents reported.  This 
exponential increase in incidents demonstrates another interesting and important fact.  
There are more and more people who are proliferating cyber attacks.  As shown in Figure 
1, the cyber attacks are becoming more and more sophisticated yet the average person’s 
knowledge required to spawn an attack is actually being reduced.  One of the major 
reasons for this is because the internet has enabled hackers to share their experiences and 
techniques and obtain tools.  For example, a New Jersey man was charged with computer 
criminal activity and attempted criminal activity for placing spyware on his landlord’s 
computer to see how she was going to proceed collecting a $10,000 judgment from him.  
A service provider verified that the spyware came from his email address.  He is currently 
out on $30,000 bail.4
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Figure 1 – Intruder Knowledge vs. Attack Sophistication 
Cyber threats are real.  Cyber attacks come from a wide variety of sources including, 
viruses/worms/trojans/etc, an insider or a disgruntled employee, neighborhood hackers, 
industrial espionage, terrorists.  Reconnaissance is typically a pre-cursor to an attack.  All 
of the above mentioned sources can cause problems with control systems.  However, 
some of these sources have the intent to create problems on a very large scale.  Two 
examples are note worthy.  First, the Washington Times reported that “China is actively 
developing options to create chaos on the island, to compromise components of Taiwan’s 
critical infrastructure.”5  Then Media Corp News reported that “North Korea has trained 
more than 500 computer hackers capable of launching cyber warfare against the United 
States. . . The Military hackers had been put through a five-year university course 
training them to penetrate the computer systems of South Korea, the United States and 
Japan.”6
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has an objective to “create a 
national-level capability to coordinate between government and industry to reduce 
vulnerabilities and respond to the threats associated with the control systems that 
comprise our National Critical Infrastructure.”7  The mission of the DHS National Cyber 
Security Division is to be the focal point for addressing cyber security issues in the 
United States.”8  In order to accomplish that mission, the DHS National Cyber Security 
Division has established the Control System Security and Test Center (CSSTC).  The 
CSSTC is working to identify, analyze and eliminate vulnerabilities associated with the 
control systems in critical infrastructure applications.  A major effort is being made to 
increase awareness of the need for cybersecurity and what to do to reduce vulnerabilities 
in control systems. 
Taking action to reduce or eliminate a vulnerability will reduce the probability of a 
successful cyber attack.  There are common things that any company can do to reduce the 
vulnerabilities in their control system.  Below are the top 10 vulnerabilities commonly 
found within control systems. 
Top 10 Vulnerabilities in Control Systems
10. Insufficient network separation (protection) between corporate and real-
time control systems.  The corporate and process control networks should be 
separated by a properly configured firewall.  The architecture of the network 
is essential to good cybersecurity.  Figure 2 shows the recommended network 
architecture. 
Figure 2 – Recommended Network Architecture 
9. Security efforts focused solely on corporate internet interface point.  
When the IT organization assumes that if the corporate network is protected 
then the rest of the control system is protected it leaves the process control 
network open for attack.  Some of the best and most secure networks have 
been compromised by an employee bringing in a laptop w/an embedded 
Trojan or Worm, connecting to the production network and introducing the 
malicious code.  Therefore, practicing defense in depth is an essential 
cybersecurity practice. 
8. Remote access to the process control LAN not properly secured.  Many 
control systems have modems or wireless access.  These communication 
points need to be secured with, for example, encryption or passwords.  
Equipment vendors frequently leave open ports for remote maintenance of 
equipment.
7. Dual-Network cards installed and in use, bridging the two networks.  If a 
single computer has direct access to both the corporate and process control 
networks through separate network cards, a hacker can bypass the firewall.  
This can include remote communications when the remote user connects 
through a commercial ISP service.   
6. Null-Session Authentication, shared folders, and “everyone” permissions 
defeat any internal IT controls.  Everyone needs to be trained on good 
cybersecurity practices.  These commonly found security “no-no’s” are 
primarily used for exploiting a system once access is gained.  The fewer 
internal access controls are in place the easier it is for a successful penetration 
to turn into a successful exploitation. 
5. Process LAN and associated systems easy to find by obvious PC name.  If 
a hacker can make it into the process control network, it only makes life easier 
for them if they can easily recognize the names of the equipment, 
instrumentation and controllers.  There are many instances of people making 
life easier by naming their systems with critical information, i.e., Firewall1, 
Primary DNS, Historian or History1. 
4. No outbound filtering of data.  Data needs to be filtered as it exits the 
process control network as well as filtering the data stream as it enters.  The 
only way to know what is being transferred into and out of your network is to 
look at the data.  Know which systems should be talking to which systems and 
look for anomalies. 
3. Workstations / Servers running process control applications not properly 
patched.  Nearly every critical exploit for the past several years has had an 
existing patch.  Patches are created by the vendor to make their system work 
better and operate more securely.  Keep your anti-virus software updated, too.  
Patching in control systems is not easy.  We must test, retest and then 
carefully examine both the need and the net gain.  If equal protection or 
mitigation can be gained another way for the short term then use it while you 
plan and patch.
2. Policies either not in place, not followed, inadequate or not enforced 
(password, backup/restore, etc…).  Event the best training program and the 
best network architecture will be defeated if the company policies are 
inadequate or not enforced.  Passwords have been found taped to the system, 
under the keyboard, in a file on the system named “Passwords” or “psswd” 
and even shared with coworkers.   
1. Social engineering (i.e., human factors) and physical security extremely 
weak.  Your friendly industrial espionage agent will tell you that a few secrets 
learned through social engineering or by gaining access to the network system 
will make the hackers’ job infinitely easier.  An effective counterintelligence 
or Operations Security program and strict adherence to policies and 
procedures are essential. 
3. CONCLUSION
Cybersecurity is critical to success in today’s business world.  It helps defend against 
cyber attack on control systems for both the casual and the malicious intruder as well as 
industrial espionage.  Cyber attacks are a reality in today’s world, and critical 
infrastructures are increasingly the target.  The number of cyber incidences and the 
sophistication of the attacks have dramatically increased.  Companies can defend 
themselves against these attacks by reducing their process control network vulnerabilities 
and following good security practices and procedures.  Critical infrastructures, such as 
the chemical industry, need to be proactive and protect their assets from potential cyber 
attacks and to ensure the safety of workers, the public and our environment. 
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